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NOTE
Out of ‘Site: Can Government Officials
Block Their Constituents on Social Media?
Lindsey Wilkerson*

I. INTRODUCTION
Social media has revolutionized the way people communicate and
created new questions about what is considered free speech. Part of this trend
is how government officials – ranging from small town mayors to the
President of the United States – are using social media websites like Facebook
and Twitter.1 Many social media websites provide the ability for users to
block others from seeing their posts, which can create controversy for
government officials.2 If a government official blocks a constituent, courts
usually examine whether the official was operating his or her social media
account for either personal or governmental purposes.3 If the account was
being used for the latter, there could be a First Amendment claim present.4
This Note examines the divided views between courts on governmental
*

Bachelor of Journalism, University of Missouri, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of
Missouri School of Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2019-2021.
I am grateful to Professor Wells for her insight, guidance, and support during the
writing of this summary, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing
process.
1. See, e.g., Josh Seaver, Mayor, Belle Missouri, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/SeaverMayor2018/
[https://perma.cc/G9WX-E7BM]
(last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (showing the Facebook page of the mayor of Belle,
Missouri);
President
Donald
J.
Trump,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/POTUS/ [https://perma.cc/2XJA-H4PR] (last visited Oct.
12, 2019) (showing the Facebook page of the President of the United States, Donald
J. Trump).
2. How to block accounts on Twitter, TWITTER (last visited Sept. 24, 2020),
https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts
[https://perma.cc/QQ2V-QUUJ]; Unfriending or Blocking Someone,T FACEBOOK
(last
visited
Sept.
24,
2020),
https://www.facebook.com/help/1000976436606344?helpref=hc_global_nav
[https://perma.cc/2QXT-CPTV].
3. See Campbell v. Reisch, 2019 WL 3856591, at *12 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 16,
2019) (holding a government official could not block a constituent from her Twitter
page because it was a public forum).
4. Id. at *18.
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officials’ use of the block function on their social media pages and how it
could be considered viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment if
the page is used for governmental purposes.
Part II of this Note takes a look at the background of social media and
how courts have adapted to its growth. It also examines how government
officials, in particular, have jumped on the bandwagon for social media usage
in their political campaigns and day-to-day interactions with constituents.
With this development, courts are figuring out how social media translates
into the preexisting precedent on public forum doctrine. Part III of this Note
compares and contrasts various cases brought to courts in various jurisdictions
regarding government officials’ social media usage. Part IV breaks down the
main arguments that are made in those cases and highlights the ones that
should prevail in the modern age of social media usage and evolving First
Amendment jurisprudence. Despite the new challenges in this area of law,
courts have generally viewed these cases under the concept of a “designated”
public forum and have found that government officials cannot block
constituents on social media platforms.5

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Social media has become part of the everyday lives of many people
across the United States, regardless of age, race, gender, income, or
education.6 Because of this, courts have gradually seen more and more cases
with its involvement.7 Subpart A generally describes the growth of social
media and specifically discusses its function as a forum for online discourse.
Subpart B discusses how speech on social media can be protected under the
First Amendment in cases where the government is involved. Subpart C dives
further into how government officials tend to use social media for their own
benefit. Finally, Subpart D outlines how a First Amendment claim is
generally formatted if a government official blocks a constituent from viewing
and interacting with his or her social media page.

5. See Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018).
6. See Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 12, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/
[https://perma.cc/2CDC-GF23] (showing that social media use has steadily increased
in the stated classifications).
7. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017).
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A. Social Media in General and How It Works
Over the past few decades, the Internet has become a prominent part of
everyday life.8 Social media, in particular, has grown significantly.9 Some of
the most widely-used social media platforms include Twitter and Facebook.10
In 2019, Twitter had approximately 321 million monthly users,11 and
Facebook had 2.41 billion.12 Both platforms allow “users to directly interact
with each other.”13
On Twitter, users can post their thoughts and opinions – commonly
referred to as tweeting – and other users can reply to those tweets with their
own opinions.14 When users reply to each other’s tweets, it creates a comment
thread.15 A viewer of the comment thread can see replies to the original tweet
directly below the tweet as well as second-level replies (replies to the replies
of the original tweet).16 Users can also acknowledge other users’ tweets in
two ways. They can copy other users’ tweets onto their own profile – referred
to as retweeting – or they can simply “like” the tweet to show “approval or
acknowledgment” of the tweet.17 A user’s tweets and retweets are published
on a “continuously–updated ‘timeline,’” or online profile, while their likes are
listed on a separate page.18
Facebook is similar, allowing users to “debate religion and politics with
their friends and neighbors or share vacation photos.”19 There are two types
of Facebook profiles that are commonly used. Facebook is prominently used
to have a personal profile, which is for “non-commercial use and represent[s]

8. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (citing Am.
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996)) (“The Internet
has experienced ‘extraordinary growth.’”).
9. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1732 (“Today, one of the most important places to
exchange views is cyberspace, particularly social media. . .”).
10. While there are plenty of other social media platforms on the Internet, this
article will focus primarily on Twitter and Facebook since most courts have only
looked at those platforms in this area of law thus far.
11. Jacob Kastrenakes, Twitter keeps losing monthly users, so it’s going to stop
sharing
how
many,
THE
VERGE
(Feb
7,
2019,
7:55AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/7/18213567/twitter-to-stop-sharing-mau-as-usersdecline-q4-2018-earnings [https://perma.cc/2EYY-TYVL].
12. Company Info, FACEBOOK (last visited Sept. 28, 2020),
https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ [https://perma.cc/93MR-H7UY].
13. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226,
230 (2d Cir. 2019).
14. Let’s Go Twitter, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/en_us/lets-gotwitter.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6AC4-J7FS].
15. Knight, 928 F.3d at 230.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
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individual people.”20 Facebook also allows users to create a professional
page, which “‘help[s] businesses, organizations, and brands share their stories
and connect with people.’”21 At the time this Note was written, Facebook
pages consisted of three columns.22 The left-most column included a title,
picture, and navigation bar.23 The middle column was comparable to a Twitter
user’s “timeline” in that it was “organized in reverse chronological order” and
contained posts from the owner of the page and “comments by Facebook users
on those posts.”24 Finally, the right-most column included information about
the page, including contact information, how many likes the page has, and the
page’s self-identified purpose.25 For many government officials using social
media, the right-most column is what identified them as government
officials.26
Both Twitter and Facebook allow users to “block” other users from
seeing their content. “Block is a feature that helps . . . users in restricting
specific accounts from contacting them, seeing their [posts], and following
them.”27 On both Facebook and Twitter, if a user is blocked, he or she cannot
see any content from the user that blocked him or her.28 This prevents the
user from interacting with the user or the content.29 Blocking is not a
permanent decision; both Twitter and Facebook allow users to change their
minds and unblock a user if he or she desires.30 Blocked accounts are not
notified that they have been blocked; however, on Twitter, if they attempt to
visit the profile of the account that has blocked them, they will see a message
that they have been blocked.31 Similarly, a blocked Facebook user could
notice that they are no longer “friends” with the person that blocked them.32
Also, on Twitter, the blocking function only works if the person who is
blocked is actually logged into his or her Twitter account. 33 For example, if

20. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 673 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Jan. 9,
2019).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 674.
26. Id.
27. How to block accounts on Twitter, supra note 2.
28. Id.; Unfriending or Blocking Someone, supra note 2.
29. How to block accounts on Twitter, supra note 2. When a user is blocked,
they are prevented from liking, retweeting, or replying to posts. Id.
30. How to block accounts on Twitter, supra note 2; Unfriending or Blocking
Someone, supra note 2.
31. How to block accounts on Twitter, supra note 2; Unfriending or Blocking
Someone, supra note 2.
32. Unfriending or Blocking Someone, supra note 2.
33. How to block accounts on Twitter, supra note 2.
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a Twitter account is public, the user that was blocked could log out of his or
her account and view the tweets anonymously.34

B. Social Media, Government, and the First Amendment
“Interactive social,” like Facebook and Twitter, “can foster citizens’
First Amendment rights to speak, receive information, associate with fellow
citizens, and petition government for redress of grievances.”35 The United
States Supreme Court has also suggested that social media is subject to First
Amendment protection.36 This reasoning branches from the text of the First
Amendment itself, in that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”37 Notice that Congress is the subject of this provision;
the First Amendment prevents government regulation of speech.38 It does not
apply to private parties.39 Because of this, private citizens can block one
another on social media platforms without violating the First Amendment.40
First Amendment issues tend to arise when the government gets involved
in the regulation of social media usage.41 Many government officials have
made their own pages on social media to represent themselves and their
respective governmental office.42 Specifically, many government officials
use social media accounts to hear the thoughts and concerns of their
constituents.43 This function of social media became so prominent that

34. Id.
35. Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2011).
36. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017); see Reno v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. Id.
39. Lata Nott, Is your speech protected by the First Amendment?, FREEDOM
FORUM
INSTITUTE
(last
visited
Sept.
28,
2020),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/primers/basics/
[https://perma.cc/XJH5-6ADQ] (showing a primer on what the First Amendment
protects).
40. See McKercher v. Morrison, No. 18CV1054 JM(BLM), 2019 WL 1098935,
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) (showing that a former mayor was a private citizen, so
he could block other users as he wished).
41. See, e.g., Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (“In sum, to foreclose access to
social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise
of First Amendment rights.”).
42. See,
e.g.,
Senator
Roy
Blunt,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/SenatorBlunt/ [https://perma.cc/P35L-J97L] (last visited
Sept.
28,
2020);
Cory
Booker
(@corybooker),
TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/corybooker [https://perma.cc/7UNS-NYMP] (last visited Sept. 28,
2020).
43. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (“[U]sers can petition their elected
representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner. Indeed,
Governors in all 50 States and almost every Member of Congress have set up accounts
for this purpose.”).
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Facebook created a feature called “Town Hall” in 2017 that encouraged users
to “find, follow[,] and contact their government officials” and “see a feed of
what their government is posting on Facebook.”44 Courts have now
recognized that the First Amendment can be implicated if government
officials block people from viewing their social media pages.45
There has been quite a bit of controversy concerning whether
government officials can block users from seeing the content on their pages.46
Some reports suggest this feature has already been commonly utilized by
officials.47 Many legal scholars have since compared the blocking function
on social media by government officials as a restraint on free speech in a
virtual public forum.48 They argue that since the pages are operated for a
governmental purpose, the officials should not be permitted to engage in
viewpoint discrimination.49 Viewpoint discrimination can occur when speech
is restricted based on a disagreement with “the speaker’s specific motivating
ideology, opinion, or perspective.”50
If a First Amendment claim is brought by a constituent who was blocked
by a government official, two main doctrines are argued: the government
speech doctrine and the public forum doctrine. First, the government speech
44. What
is
Town
Hall
on
Facebook?,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/278545442575921?helpref=search&sr=1&query=to
wnhall [https://perma.cc/SQL7-C7CD] (last visited Sept. 28, 2020).
45. See Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019); Robinson v. Hunt Cty.,
Texas, 921 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (May 16, 2019); Knight First
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
46. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Trump Can’t Block Critics From His Twitter
Account, Appeals Court Rules, NEW YORK TIMES (July 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/us/politics/trump-twitter-firstamendment.html [https://perma.cc/86ER-KPLK].
47. Leora Smith & Derek Kravitz, Governors and Federal Agencies Are
Blocking Nearly 1,300 Accounts on Facebook and Twitter, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 8,
2017, 12:43 p.m. EST),
https://www.propublica.org/article/governors-and-federal-agencies-are-blockingaccounts-on-facebook-and-twitter [https://perma.cc/5NHS-K7P6].
48. See, e.g., Jonathan Groffman, The Modern Public Square: Digital Viewpoint
Discrimination in the Age of @realdonaldtrump, 25 CARDOZO J. EQUAL RTS. & SOC.
JUST. 69, 90 (2018) (“Expanding the civil right of action in § 1983 of the US Code to
include the official social media accounts of political officials in the definition of
designated public forums would therefore help ensure an Internet free from censorship
and also uphold the guarantees of the First Amendment.”); Kathleen McGarvey
Hidy, Social Media Use and Viewpoint Discrimination: A First Amendment Judicial
Tightrope Walk with Rights and Risks Hanging in the Balance, 102 MARQ. L. REV.
1045, 1085 (2019) (“[V]iewpoint discrimination challenges move from the online
arena into the judicial arena. Courts grapple with applying First Amendment
jurisprudence, established through United States Supreme Court precedent, to these
viewpoint discrimination legal claims.”).
49. Groffman, supra note 48; McGarvey Hidy, supra note 48.
50. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 820
(1995).
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doctrine prevents speech made by the government from being subjected to the
First Amendment.51 Following this, if a court finds that a government
official’s social media page is a form of government speech, then a First
Amendment claim would be barred.52 Recently established precedent
indicates that courts generally find government officials’ tweets to be
government speech, but the “interactive space” below the posts, which are
open for the public to comment and reply, are not.53 Second, a “public forum,”
generally, is a place “devoted to assembly and debate.”54 To determine if
private social media pages can foster public discourse with First Amendment
protection, courts have extended the public forum doctrine to include the
“interactive space” of government officials’ social media pages.55 However,
there has been some frustration in applying the preexisting public forum
analysis to government officials’ social media pages.56

C. Analyzing this Issue as a First Amendment Claim
As government officials ramped up their social media usage and started
to block constituents, plaintiffs filed cases alleging First Amendment
violations.57 Courts have had to interpret previous public forum doctrine to
determine if it applies to social media pages.58 Courts in various jurisdictions
have started the discussion by determining if the constituent’s speech was
subject to First Amendment protection.59 Any private speech – including any
form of expression – can be subject to First Amendment protection,60 and the
First Amendment “generally prevents government from proscribing

51. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009); Knight First
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 239 (2d Cir. 2019).
52. Summun, 555 U.S. at 469; Knight, 928 F.3d at 239.
53. Knight, 928 F.3d at 233.
54. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
55. See e.g. Knight, 928 F.3d at 237; Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129BCW, 2019 WL 3856591, at *7 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2019).
56. Compare Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018)
(holding that a government official could block a constituent from his Facebook page
because it was not a public forum) with Campbell, 2019 WL 3856591, at *7 (holding
a government official could not block a constituent from her Twitter page because it
was a public forum).
57. E.g., Campbell, 2019 WL 3856591 at *7.
58. See, e.g., Knight, 928 F.3d at 236.
59. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp.
3d 541, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). The author of this
Note declines to discuss the specific elements that must be shown to make a First
Amendment claim, as that is not particularly germane to the analysis in this Note.
60. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (finding that flag
burning is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (showing that children
wearing black armbands constituted speech under the First Amendment).
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speech.”61 The government should be hesitant to restrict private speech, with
the exception of a few limited circumstances.62
If the speech is protected speech, then the court looks at whether the
speech was conducted within a public forum.63 To determine this, courts use
a two-prong test, created by a combination of case law: (1) whether the forum
was within “government control,”64 and (2) if the use of the forum was
consistent with the “purpose, structure, and intended use of the space.”65
Social media platforms are usually owned by private companies, which on the
surface can seem unlikely to be considered public forums.66 However, “[j]ust
as the government can rent a building to use as a forum for public debate and
discussion, so, too, can it ‘rent’ a social media page for the promotion of
public discussion.”67
Once the court determines that the social media page is a public forum,
it then has to decide what kind of public forum it is.68 There are three possible
categories: traditional, designated, and nonpublic.69 For speech to receive the
utmost protection under the First Amendment, it needs to fall within the
traditional or designated categories.70 Social media pages do not fall in line
with the types of places that have traditionally been held as public forums,
such as public streets and parks..71 Government social media pages are
generally thought to be either nonpublic or designated public forums.72 A
nonpublic forum is public property that is not traditionally considered as a
“forum for public communication” and has not been designated as such.73
61. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
62. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (holding that obscene
speech is not subject to First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. State of New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (holding that “fighting words” are not protected
by the First Amendment).
63. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985).
64. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d
Cir. 2019).
65. Id.
66. Lidsky, supra note 35, at 1996.
67. Lidsky, supra note 35, at 1996.
68. Lidsky, supra note 35, at 1996.
69. Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-BCW, 2019 WL 3856591, at *7
(W.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2019).
70. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983) (In traditional public fora, “the rights of the state to limit expressive activity
are sharply circumscribed.” In designated public fora, “the Constitution forbids a state
to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was
not required to create the forum in the first place.”).
71. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985).
72. See, e.g., Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018);
Campbell, 2019 WL 3856591, at *6–7.
73. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
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Examples of a nonpublic forums are airport terminals,74 school mail
facilities,75 and political debates on a state-owned television station.76
A designated public forum, on the other hand, is created when the
government uses property or a place that has not “traditionally been regarded
as a public forum” but “is intentionally opened up for that purpose.”77 The
Supreme Court has found that a university student organization’s religious
newspaper and a municipal auditorium can be examples of designated public
forums.78 In a designated public forum, if a restriction on speech is
challenged, then the government’s actions are subject to strict scrutiny
reviewal.79 This means that once a government has “intentionally designated”
a place as a public forum, “speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling
governmental interest.”80 However, it seems like the government can close a
designated public forum whenever it desires.81 It is important to note,
however, that just because a private space has been designated as a public
forum by the government, does not mean that speech must be completely
unrestricted; rather, the government can monitor and restrict the forum as long
as it is being viewpoint neutral and reasonable in doing so.82 If the court
cannot find that the government purposely wanted to open up a space as a
public forum or if “the nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive
activity,” then it will default to the space being a nonpublic forum.83 Courts
have generally viewed nonpublic forums as the default category until
determined otherwise; however, the line distinguishing the two categories can
be “maddeningly slippery.”84
Determining whether a space is a nonpublic forum or a designated public
forum is murky territory and generally decided on a case-by-case basis. By
looking at surrounding facts and circumstances, courts must determine
whether the government intentionally opened itself up for commentary in a
nontraditional forum.85 However, because this is not a bright-line test, district
74. See Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683
(1992).
75. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
76. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998).
77. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
78. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30
(1995); see also Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975).
79. Ark. Educ. Television Co., 523 U.S. at 677; Price v. City of New York, No.
15 CIV. 5871 (KPF), 2018 WL 3117507, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018).
80. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985).
81. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(“Although a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the
facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional
public forum.”).
82. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 (2010).
83. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803.
84. Lidsky, supra note 35, at 1989–1990.
85. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46).
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courts have been thoroughly divided,86 and appellate courts have provided
limited guidance.87

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
This Part examines how the addition of social media usage into the mix
of already confusing public forum jurisprudence has created differing results
in courts across the country in cases regarding government officials blocking
constituents from their social media pages. Subpart A looks exclusively at
cases at the district court level while Subpart B analyzes how appellate courts
have molded the holdings of these cases into something more uniform.

A. Evolving District Courts
Cases surrounding this issue started surfacing in district courts primarily
after 2016,88 and initially, courts were hesitant to rule in favor of plaintiffs
who claimed their First Amendment rights had been violated.89 For example,
in several cases, courts dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for not showing that a
government official had acted in an official capacity when they blocked
constituents.90
In German v. Eudaly, the plaintiff, German, was a politically active
community member who frequently testified at city council meetings.91 After
one meeting, Eudaly, the county commissioner, posted on her personal
Facebook account that she was displeased with German’s comments at a
recent council meeting.92 Eudaly blocked German from seeing her posts so
German was not able to respond to Eudaly’s criticisms.93 German sued,
claiming that Eudaly had violated her First Amendment rights when she
blocked her on Facebook, but the court found differently.94 Because Eudaly
86. Compare Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018)
(holding that a government official could block a constituent from his Facebook page
because it was not a public forum) with Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-BCW,
2019 WL 3856591, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2019) (holding a government official
could not block a constituent from her Twitter page because it was a public forum).
87. See Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019); Robinson v. Hunt Cty.,
Texas, 921 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (May 16, 2019); Knight First
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
88. Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1:16CV932 (JCC/IDD),
2016 WL 4801617, at *7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 14, 2016).
89. See, e.g., German v. Eudaly, No. 3:17-CV-2028-MO, 2018 WL 3212020, at
*9 (D. Or. June 29, 2018); Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky.
2018).
90. See, e.g., German, No. 3:17-CV-2028-MO, 2018 WL 3212020, at *9;
Morgan, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1010.
91. German, 2018 WL 3212020, at *1.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *2.
94. Id. at *9.
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blocked German from her “nonofficial Facebook account,” the court said
German could not claim that her First Amendment rights had been violated.95
Similarly, in Morgan v. Bevin, a group of plaintiffs sued the governor of
Kentucky, claiming he had violated their First Amendment rights when he
blocked them from his personal Facebook and Twitter pages.96 In the
comment section of the governor’s posts on Facebook and in the replies to his
tweets on Twitter, the plaintiffs criticized the governor on policy issues and
personal controversies, like the governor’s allegedly “then-overdue property
taxes.”97 The governor claimed that he blocked the plaintiffs because he
thought they were “spamming” his page.98 The court found that the
governor’s actions were justifiable because the “use of privately owned
Facebook [p]age and Twitter pages is personal speech, and, because he is
speaking on his own behalf, even on his own behalf as a public official, ‘the
First Amendment strictures that attend the various types of governmentestablished forums do not apply.’”99
However, beginning in late 2018, some district courts started siding with
plaintiffs.100 This transition initially started when a court in Maine declined
to follow the “key pillars” of the Morgan court.101 In Leuthy v. LePage, two
Maine residents sued the Governor of Maine, claiming that he violated their
free speech by blocking their access to his public social media page and by
deleting their comments from the page based on their viewpoints.102 The court
found that the governor had made a clear distinction between his personal
social media pages and those that were dedicated to his term as governor of
the state.103 Since the governor blocked the Maine residents from viewing the
social media page devoted to his role as governor, he had violated the
residents’ right to free speech when he blocked them.104
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
also heard two separate cases concerning the constitutionality of government
officials’ blocking behaviors in 2018.105 In both cases, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs had proven that being blocked by a government official on social
95. Id.
96. Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018).
97. Id. at 1008.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1010–11 (quoting Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015)).
100. Leuthy v. LePage, No. 1:17-CV-00296-JAW, 2018 WL 4134628, at *16 (D.
Me. Aug. 29, 2018), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 1:17-CV-00296-JAW, 2018
WL 4955194 (D. Me. Oct. 12, 2018); Price v. City of New York, No. 15 CIV. 5871
(KPF), 2018 WL 3117507, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018).
101. Leuthy, 2018 WL 4134628, at *16.
102. Id. at *1.
103. Id. at *4.
104. Id. at *15.
105. See Price v. City of New York, No. 15 CIV. 5871 (KPF), 2018 WL 3117507
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018); Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
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media constituted a First Amendment violation.106 In Knight First
Amendment Institute at Columbia University. v. Trump (Knight I), the court
heard a case against President Donald J. Trump.107 A group of plaintiffs –
Twitter users – sued the President after he blocked them from his personal
Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, because of their political views.108 In
its analysis, the court found that although the President uses an official Twitter
account for his presidency (@POTUS), he also uses @realDonaldTrump for
governmental purposes, so neither account can act in a viewpoint
discriminatory manner.109 The court also found that the government can
initially control the “interactive space” by controlling which users can reply
or retweet tweets initially sent from the @realDonaldTrump account, but it
cannot limit the “subsequent dialogue in the comment thread.”110 While the
court acknowledged that blocking someone on Twitter does not fully prevent
them from interacting with the President’s Twitter account,111 it found that the
inconveniences caused by the President’s actions outweighed this workaround
and blocking the plaintiffs still violated their First Amendment rights.112
The court reached a similar decision in a distinguishable case, Price v.
City of New York.113 In Price, the plaintiff approached the New York Police
Department about being harassed and harmed by another resident.114 One
way that the plaintiff communicated her concerns was by tweeting the police
department on Twitter.115 The department blocked her, and she filed suit.116
Price was decided about a month after Knight I, and the court acknowledged
that Knight I had a discernable procedural posture and facts behind its
claim.117
First, Knight I stemmed from cross-motions of summary judgment,
while Price examined a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.118 For a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the court had to examine every “well-pleaded complaint” in
Price’s complaint,119 while in Knight I, the court only had to evaluate whether
each plaintiff asserted a “genuine issue of material fact” against the defendant

106. Price, 2018 WL 3117507, at *16; Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y.
2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
107. 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549.
108. Id. at 553.
109. Id. at 576.
110. Id. at 570.
111. Id. at 554.
112. Id. at 580.
113. No. 15 CIV. 5871 (KPF), 2018 WL 3117507, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018).
114. Id. at *2.
115. Id. at *3.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *10.
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. at *11.
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overall.120 Because of this, the court had to review several more hefty claims
in Price than it had to consider in Knight I.
Second, the facts behind Price were strikingly different. In Price, the
plaintiff was in an abusive relationship.121 Price received a restraining order
against her abuser, but police officers refused to serve it on him and claimed
she was a “fabricator.”122 Soon after, a stranger assaulted Price.123 When she
went to police again, they refused to file a complaint.124 In response, Price
complained on Twitter about the department, occasionally replying to its
tweets directly.125 The department blocked her “shortly thereafter.”126 In
comparison, the plaintiffs in Knight I claimed that the President had blocked
them because “[t]hey each tweeted a message critical of the President or his
policies in reply to a tweet from the @realDonaldTrump account,” and they
were blocked by the President “shortly thereafter.”127 Despite these factual
and procedural differences, however, the court still came to a similar
conclusion; Price’s replies were in the “interactive space” of the police
department’s Twitter page, and she was removed from the designated public
forum when the department blocked her.128

B. Appellate Intervention
While cases like Price and Knight I started the district courts’ discussion
on these issues and reasoned that some plaintiffs had prevailing arguments in
these cases,129 appellate interpretation really led the way for a transition in
various district courts throughout the nation.130 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for example, found that the chair of a county
board of commissioners engaged in viewpoint discrimination when she
120. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d
541, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
121. Price, 2018 WL 3117507, at *1.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *2.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *3.
126. Id.
127. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d
541, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
128. Price, 2018 WL 3117507 at *16.
129. See Lauren Beausoleil, Is Trolling Trump A Right or A Privilege?: The
Erroneous Finding in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v.
Trump, 60 B.C.L. REV. E-Supplement II.–31, II.–31 (2019) (arguing in the abstract,
“Knight First Amendment Institute marks the first instance in which a court identified
a public forum within a public official’s twitter account.”); David McGee, What
Constitutes A Public Forum on Social Media?, Hum. Rts., 2018 (“The District Court,
in a case of first impression, found Trump’s argument unpersuasive.”).
130. See, e.g., One Wisconsin Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940, 955 (W.D.
Wis. 2019); Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-BCW, 2019 WL 3856591, at *7
(W.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2019).
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blocked a constituent because the constituent’s speech was within the
“interactive space” of the social media page and, therefore, in a public
forum.131 In Davison v. Randall, the chairwoman, Randall, operated a
Facebook page, where she frequently asked for public input and discussion.132
Davison was a resident who frequently spoke up at town hall meetings about
public school funding.133 Randall posted on Facebook after one of the
meetings Davison had attended.134 Davison used his Facebook account to
comment on the chairwoman’s Facebook post, and allegedly claimed that
school board members had accepted “kickback money.”135 Randall blocked
Davison’s account, but after a change of heart, unblocked him.136 The court
found that the part of the Facebook page that Davison interacted with was a
public forum.137 The court reasoned that “Randall also expressly opened the
Chair’s Facebook Page’s middle column—its interactive space—for ‘ANY’
user to post on ‘ANY issues.’” 138 By this statement, the government –
Randall – had intentionally opened up a designated public forum, and
therefore, could not engage in viewpoint discrimination by blocking
Davison.139
Cases like Davison also appeared in Second and Fifth Circuits, and those
courts held similarly.140 Knight I was appealed to the Second Circuit, which
affirmed the district court’s decision in Knight II: “[T]he First Amendment
does not permit a public official who utilizes a social media account for all
manner of official purposes to exclude persons from an otherwise–open online
dialogue because they expressed views with which the official disagrees.”141
In Robinson v. Hunt County, Texas, the Fifth Circuit heard a case where
a county sheriff’s office was under fire for blocking people from its Facebook

131. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 687 (4th Cir. 2019).
132. Id. at 674.
133. Id. at 675.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 676.
137. Id. at 688.
138. Id. at 687.
139. Id. It is worth contrasting this result with another case that Davison brought
against the county, this time suing a Commonwealth attorney. In that case, the court
found that Davison’s First Amendment rights had not been violated. Davison’s
comments could be deleted because the Loudoun County Social Media Comments
Policy had outlined a purpose in “present[ing] matters of public interest in Loudoun
County,” and therefore, deleting Davison’s comments was not viewpoint
discriminatory. Davison v. Plowman, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 771 (E.D. Va.
2017), aff’d, 715 F. App’x 298 (4th Cir. 2018).
140. Robinson v. Hunt Cty., Texas, 921 F.3d 440, 448 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g
denied (May 16, 2019); Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). Throughout this Note, the appellate level of this case
will be referred to in-text as Knight II.
141. Knight, 928 F.3d at 230.
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page.142 The page’s description said the sheriff’s office welcomed public
comment but specifically said, “please note that this is NOT a public
forum.”143 The sheriff’s office posted on its page that “ANY post filled with
foul language, hate speech of all types and comments that are considered
inappropriate will be removed and the user banned.”144 Robinson and other
Facebook users commented on the post and criticized the sheriff’s office for
deleting comments and blocking users.145 The sheriff’s office blocked
Robinson shortly after.146 The Fifth Circuit quickly concluded that the
Facebook page was a “forum subject to First Amendment protection” because
the sheriff’s office provided no evidence to the contrary – other than its brief
statement on its Facebook page – and the district court below did not address
the issue.147

IV. DISCUSSION
When deciding the constitutionality of public officials blocking
constituents on social media platforms, there are two focal points where courts
tend to diverge: (1) whether a public official uses his or her social media
profiles for personal use or governmental use; and (2) what kind of public
forum – if any – his or her social media pages can be.148

A. Who Is Speaking and In What Capacity?
Courts are correct in making the distinction between personal use and
governmental use for public officials’ social media pages. This analysis has
been articulated in many of the courts’ analyses when it surfaces in their
dockets.149 For example, the Second Circuit in Knight II made clear that
while President Trump’s Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, was
ultimately used for governmental purposes, “[o]f course, not every social
media account operated by a public official is a government account.”150
The line between determining if an account is for governmental use or
personal use is tricky. On one hand, there are cases like Knight I and Knight
II that found that President Trump’s Twitter account was governmental
142. Robinson, 921 F.3d at 445.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 448.
148. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.2d
226, 231 (2d Cir. 2019); Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1005 (E.D. Ky.
2018).
149. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 680 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (Jan. 9,
2019); Knight, 928 F.3d at 234–236; Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1011
(E.D. Ky. 2018).
150. Knight, 928 F.3d at 236.
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speech because the account “bear[ed] all the trappings of an official, state–run
account.”151 In defense of this, the court acknowledged that the description
of the page said it was registered to “45th President of the United States of
America, Washington D.C.” and had a header photo showing the President
conducting typical presidential activities like “signing executive orders,
delivering remarks at the White House, and meeting with the Pope, heads of
state, and other foreign dignitaries.”152
On the other hand, this rationale was not enough for the Morgan court.153
That court acknowledged that Kentucky Governor Bevin “maintains official
Facebook and Twitter accounts” and cited the governor’s Twitter and
Facebook pages.154 While the case was decided in 2018, Governor Bevin’s
social media pages still tend to reflect President Trump’s in several ways. The
governor’s Twitter page has a Twitter header that labels him as the governor
of Kentucky, and the page’s description also labels him as “Governor of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.”155 Still, the court was convinced that
Governor Bevin was not attempting to control the speech of constituents by
using his Twitter page, so the page was just personal speech and not subject
to the First Amendment.156
This back and forth line of reasoning is like walking a very wobbly tightrope; in determining whether a social media page is used for personal or
official purposes, courts must evaluate each government official’s social
media page on a case-by-case basis. Questions are already beginning to arise
with these distinctions. What will happen in the next decade when young,
fresh faces become public officials and their social media accounts that they
have had since high school follow them to their new public office? Does a
personal, yet still public, social media account suddenly transition to a
governmental account once they tweet that they are running for office? At
what point could a public official stand up and say that his or her account is
no longer for governmental use and is now just for personal use?157 These

151. Id. at 231.
152. Id.
153. 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1003.
154. Id. at 1005.
155. Governor Matt Bevin, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/govmattbevin
[https://perma.cc/YA3H-FPA3] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020). This information was
true at the time of this Note’s writing.
156. Morgan, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1012.
157. President Barack Obama’s Twitter account, @BarackObama, could be one
example of this in action. @BarackObama was considered the President’s personal
Twitter since he did not use it to conduct governmental business. After he left office,
his Twitter was not archived under the Presidental Records Act for this reason.
Gabriel M. A. Elorreaga, Don’t Delete That Tweet: Federal and Presidential Records
in the Age of Social Media, 50 ST. MARY’S L.J. 483, 510 (2019); Barack Obama,
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/barackobama (last visited Sept. 30, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/YKB6-CPJU].
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questions are yet to be heard by courts, but some governmental offices have
written up guidelines to help guide the transition process.158
Despite these questions and concerns, it is still necessary to draw a line
between these two different purposes of social media accounts. Governmental
officials are still people outside of their offices, and they are permitted to have
a “private presence.”159 The problem that courts have faced in past cases is
that public officials cannot take off “their ‘officialdom’ . . . upon going home
for the evening,” so it can be extremely challenging to figure out on social
media whether a government official’s online presence is meant for personal
or official purposes.160 Regardless, officials still want the ability to connect
with their close friends and family online without being subject to First
Amendment scrutiny and should be able to engage in their own right to free
speech.161

B. Reformulating the Public Forum Analysis Brings New Tensions
As discussed previously, there are three types of forums where people
can speak: traditional, designated (also referred to as limited), and nonpublic.162 In many court opinions, the court acknowledges all three categories
and breaks down why a certain category applies – or fails to apply – to social
media pages.163 Most frequently, courts have decided that by using the logic
of the “interactive space” on social media pages, the pages should be
considered a designated public forum.164
The “interactive space” concept was developed in Knight I – and later
affirmed in Knight II – to work around the barrier of the governmental speech
doctrine.165 While the President’s tweets themselves were classified as
governmental speech, the “interactive space” below the tweets – the replies
158. See AG, Governor reach Joint Memorandum of Understanding on social
media,
email
use,
THE
MISSOURI
TIMES
(May
17,
2019),
https://themissouritimes.com/ag-governor-reach-joint-memorandum-ofunderstanding-on-social-media-email-use/ [https://perma.cc/S8BP-W2H8].
159. Brian P. Kane, Social Media Is the New Town Square: The Difficulty in
Blocking Access to Public Official Accounts, 60 ADVOCATE 31, 32 (2017).
160. Id.
161. CJ Griffin, The Legal Implications of Governmental Social Media Use, N.J.
LAWYER 16, 20 (April 2019) (“While the official accounts would be subject to OPRA
and the First Amendment, by keeping the two accounts separate government officials
can ensure they have a place to engage in social networking with friends, family, and
other personal contacts, and that their own free speech rights are protected there.”).
162. Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-BCW, 2019 WL 3856591, at *6–7
(Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2019).
163. See, e.g., id. at *6–7; Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v.
Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
164. See, e.g., Campbell, 2019 WL 3856591 at *7–8; Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at
549.
165. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 573; Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2019).
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section – was found to be a designated public forum.166 In this decision, the
court created the best of both worlds – a public official can still speak freely,
as his or her speech is still considered governmental speech, and constituents
are still able to interact with that speech and bring claims if the public official
blocks them from being able to reply.167 This philosophy should be followed
by other courts, as it allows for the governmental speech doctrine and the
preexisting designated public forum doctrine to coexist.168
But even before the idea of an “interactive space” was used, some
scholars argued “government actors should be presumed to have created a
designated public forum any time they establish a presence on an interactive
social medium such as Facebook.”169 This idea is supported by the basic callto-action for many social networking sites and how public officials intend to
use them.170 In several circumstances that have surfaced in cases so far, the
public official has specifically stated that they wanted to use their official
Facebook or Twitter pages to encourage discussion, and that has been a
persuasive factor in the court’s determination of whether the page is a public
forum or not.171 Conversely, in at least one case, when an official explicitly
stated that he did not intend to create a public forum by creating the page, the
court still classified it as a designated public forum anyway.172
The majority of courts have correctly concluded that public officials’
social media pages can be designated public forums.173 However, some critics
have argued that Twitter and other social media platforms should not be public

166. Knight, 928 F.3d at 234.
167. Id.
168. Many courts are already following suit. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hunt Cty.,
Texas, 921 F.3d 440, 448 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (May 16, 2019); One
Wisconsin Now v. Kremer, 354 F. Supp. 3d 940, 955 (W.D. Wis. 2019); Campbell,
2019 WL 3856591 at *9.
169. Lidsky, supra note 35, at 1979.
170. See Our Advocacy, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/en_us/advocacy.html
[https://perma.cc/CJT6-YG3S] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) (“We advocate for free
expression and protecting the health of the public conversation around the world.”);
Mark
Zuckerberg,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/notes/markzuckerberg/bringing-the-world-closer-together/10154944663901634/
[https://perma.cc/B3WH-F2NR] (June 22, 2017) (“For the past 10 years, our mission
has been to make the world more open and connected.”). Mark Zuckerberg is the
founder and CEO of Facebook, Inc.
171. See Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 673 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting the
county commission chair whose official Facebook page was being questioned, “I
really want to hear from ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, request, criticism,
complement or just your thoughts.”). But see Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003,
1008 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (showing that, although “Governor Bevin states that he wants
to hear from the public on Facebook and Twitter,” the court still found that the
Governor’s page was a nonpublic forum).
172. Robinson, 921 F.3d at 445.
173. See, e.g., Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928
F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019); Davison, 912 F.3d at 687; Robinson, 921 F.3d at 448.
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forums at all because they are privately-owned platforms.174 Some opinion
articles want complete control in the hands of the corporations that own the
social media platforms175 since they have their own private rules and
regulations.176 Under this rationale, it would not matter if the user is the
President or a resident of “Small Town USA”; any user could face
consequences – like being blocked or banned from a page – if they violated
the website’s terms and conditions. Violating the terms and conditions would
not necessarily mean the user was criticizing the government, although it
could certainly include that.177 The span and scope of what websites’ terms
and conditions can prohibit can be much broader since it is not limited by the
First Amendment.178
However, it is problematic to think social media can only be viewed as
a private space since “the Supreme Court never has circumscribed forum
analysis solely to government-owned property.”179 It is not uncommon for
the government to use a private space, like a hotel conference room or the
back room of a restaurant, to open itself up for public comment.180 When the
government does this, the Supreme Court has found that the government
availed itself in opening a public forum.181 Despite the Supreme Court’s
precedent on public fora, critics still compare social media pages to various
Supreme Court rulings showing that places like airports, broadcasted political
debates on public television, and public school mail facilities were considered
174. Noah Feldman, Constitution Can’t Stop Trump From Blocking Tweets,
BLOOMBERG
(June
7,
2017,
11:39
AM
CDT),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-06-07/constitution-can-t-stoptrump-from-blocking-tweets [https://perma.cc/U4XP-YMGE] (“There’s no right to
free speech on Twitter. The only rule is that Twitter Inc. gets to decide who speaks
and listens—which is its right under the First Amendment. If Twitter wants to block
Trump, it can. If Trump wants to block followers, he can.”).
175. Id.
176. The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/twitter-rules [https://perma.cc/YQ4B-JJUX] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020);
Facebook Terms and Policies, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policies
[https://perma.cc/DGB2-E4UV] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
177. Feldman, supra note 174 (“Twitter can establish any rules it wants in its
private domain.”).
178. Daphne Keller, Facebook Restricts Speech by Popular Demand, THE
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
22,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/facebook-restricts-free-speechpopular-demand/598462/ [https://perma.cc/DYU9-K3KL] (“[S]et aside the First
Amendment’s speech rules in favor of new, more restrictive ones. Messages we might
once have heard from a soapbox in the park . . . can be banished from social-media
platforms.”).
179. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2019).
180. Id. at 863.
181. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
788–89 (1985) (holding that a charity drive for federal employees was a public forum
because governmental property ownership is not what the analysis should hinge on,
but rather, the First Amendment “access sought by the speaker.”).
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nonpublic forums rather than designated public forums.182 The difference
between these cases and cases considering whether government officials’
social media pages are public forums is the nature of the surrounding
circumstances. For example, Justice O’Connor once wrote, “[T]he tradition
of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been
made available for speech activity.”183 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has
enforced the idea that “social media users employ these websites to engage in
a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics ‘as diverse as
human thought.’”184
By allowing public officials’ social media pages to be considered
designated public forums, this ultimately creates First Amendment protections
that are seemingly expected by users when they log-on to their social media
accounts.185 When Facebook and Twitter’s missions seem to enforce the idea
that free speech is encouraged,186 it seems contradictory to not allow this same
purpose just because the page represents a government official. Free speech
often includes “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials,”187 and when governmental officials open
social media pages welcoming commentary on their policy decisions, they
must be ready to face the music. And when doing so, they cannot engage in
viewpoint discrimination by blocking users from dissenting thoughts
underneath the government’s speech.188

182. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676 (1998)
(holding that a televised debate on public television was a nonpublic forum, and the
network could exercise “reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of its journalistic
discretion”); Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679
(1992) (holding that airport terminals were nonpublic fora); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) (holding that mailboxes in a public
school were not a public forum).
183. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 680.
184. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017) (quoting
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
185. The Court also noted that:
[w]hile in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the
most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of
views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace . . . and social
media in particular. Seven in ten American adults use at least one
Internet social networking service.
Id. at 1735.
186. See Our Advocacy, supra note 170 (“We advocate for free expression and
protecting the health of the public conversation around the world.”); Zuckerberg,
supra note 170 (“For the past 10 years, our mission has been to make the world more
open and connected.”).
187. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
188. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226,
236 (2d Cir. 2019)
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C. Loose Ends Still Need Tying Up
Even after covering governmental speech and public forum doctrine,
there are still several lingering concerns with deciding cases involving the
constitutionality of government officials’ blocking activities. First, there can
be some ways to see a government official’s social media pages even if a user
is blocked.189 Second, in making a decision, some courts have taken into
consideration how much the user was excluded from the page.190 Finally,
some scholars are concerned with how social media fits into the reviewal
standards for a First Amendment claim, specifically in regards to designated
public forums.191

1. Workarounds
While the Knight II decision seemed to be a guiding light for many
courts, it still left plenty of wiggle room in its dicta. For example, the court
spent considerable time discussing how many “workarounds” there are to
being blocked on social media.192 While the court ultimately decided that the
inconvenience to users was enough to demonstrate that the plaintiffs were
effectively pushed out of the public forum, there is no strong demonstration
that neighboring courts would have to follow this rationale.193 A different
court could believe that the inconvenience caused by being blocked on social
media may not be enough to truly demonstrate viewpoint discrimination; for
example, the government official could effectively argue that he or she
blocked the user for a viewpoint-neutral reason. If the official considered the
speech to be “spam” or determined that the comment was not topical to the
page’s purpose, blocking that user would be permitted under the current First
Amendment jurisprudence.194

189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 232–33.
Id. at 231.
Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2156 (2009).
Specifically, the court mentioned that
blocked users who wish to participate in the comment thread of a
blocking user’s tweet could log out of their accounts, . . . Blocked
users could also create a new Twitter account. Alternatively,
blocked users could log out of their accounts, navigate to the
blocking user’s timeline, take a screenshot of the blocking user’s
tweet, then log back into their own accounts and post that
screenshot along with their own commentary.

Knight, 928 F.3d at 232–33.
193. Id. at 240.
194. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811
(1985).
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2. Does the Amount of Exclusion Matter?
The Knight II court also considered how much the President excluded
users from his social media page in making its decision.195 The court
recognized that “The President’s tweets produce an extraordinarily high level
of public engagement, typically generating thousands of replies, some of
which, in turn, generate hundreds of thousands of additional replies.”196 After
taking this into account, the court examined what kind of exclusion the
President was engaging in: specific or generic.197 The court concluded that
the President was excluding specific individuals from viewing his page
because “[t]he President ha[d] not generally sought to limit who can follow
the Account, nor has he sought to limit the kind of speech that users can post
in reply to his tweets.”198 This analysis, in part, contributed to the court’s
determination that there was viewpoint discrimination at play in the
President’s decision to block only certain users from viewing his online
profile.199
Using this standard in practice could be problematic. If courts consider
how much engagement a public official’s social media page fosters, that could
be troubling for cases where the public official is less prominent, like a smalltown mayor or a county commissioner. The smaller the audience the official’s
social media page reaches, the more likely that courts would find that the
official only intended the page to be for their personal use rather than
governmental use, and therefore, not subject to a First Amendment claim.200
In practice, this idea could be compared to the “public figure” analysis within
First Amendment law. A public figure has been defined as someone who has
“thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies” and
“invite[d] attention and comment.”201 The more fame and notoriety a
government official has, the more likely the court will find that his or her
social media pages garner “attention and comment” because it is clearer that
they have “thrust themselves to the forefront” of public discussion.202 Vice
versa, it may be more difficult to determine if a lesser-known politician truly

195. Knight, 928 F.3d at 231.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 239.
200. See generally McKercher v. Morrison, No. 18CV1054 JM(BLM), 2019 WL
1098935, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) (acknowledging that a former mayor’s
Facebook page was for personal use only, despite allegations that the personal
Facebook page was used “in order to communicate with the public about official City
matters.”); German v. Eudaly, No. 3:17-CV-2028-MO, 2018 WL 3212020, at *6 (D.
Or. June 29, 2018) (holding that a county commissioner’s Facebook page was for
solely personal use, so she could block a constituent without First Amendment
retaliation).
201. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
202. Id.
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meant to “thrust themselves to the forefront” of public discussion by having a
social media account if his or her posts do not spark much engagement.203
While public figure jurisprudence is interesting to consider with this topic, no
courts have used it yet in their analyses of whether government officials can
block constituents on their social media platforms.

3. Murky Reviewal Standards in Public Forum Doctrine
Lastly, there is some scholarly debate over what reviewal standard
should be used when the government allegedly removes someone from a
designated public forum improperly.204 The Supreme Court has puzzlingly
set a conflicting test for this issue.205 On one hand, a state can only exclude
speech in a designated public forum if it is “reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum.”206 But simultaneously, the Court has demanded a
stronger test: strict scrutiny.207 Strict scrutiny already requires two elements
to be satisfied; the government’s restrictions must (1) be “narrowly tailored,”
and (2) “serve a compelling government interest.”208 Scholars have argued
that the merging of these two standards together creates a “confusing and
unnecessary” analysis for lower courts.209 And as the public forum doctrine
has to adapt to the new world of online social media, “the need for a flexible
and finely tuned doctrine to balance free expression with the government’s
reasonable need to regulate becomes even more pressing.”210 Instead of
having this complex analysis, it would be much easier for courts to analyze
these cases under the ordinary prongs of strict scrutiny review, without having
to consider whether it was “reasonable.” Using this, the governmental
restrictions would only need to be narrowly tailored and serve a compelling
government interest.

V. CONCLUSION
This is just the beginning of a discussion that will be tweeted, posted,
and shared for years to come.211 As more people create social media accounts
– whether those people are government officials or constituents – more cases
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009).
206. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
207. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).
208. Summum, 555 U.S. at 469.
209. Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, supra note 191, at 2156.
210. Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, supra note 191, at 2141.
211. Some of these cases may not even reach the courts. See e.g. John Bowden,
Ocasio-Cortez apologizes for blocking ex-politician on Twitter, settles lawsuit (Nov.
4, 2019, 1:50PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/468877-ocasio-cortezapologizes-for-blocking-ex-politician-on-twitter-settles-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/57F9-ALNJ].
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will be brought by plaintiffs who believe their First Amendment rights have
been violated.212 Unfortunately for lower courts and the government officials
residing in their jurisdictions, there is currently no sure-fire way to decide
these cases yet.213 In the words of one court, “The constitutional limitations
and the current state of the law, as applied to state actors using social media
forums, are in flux, significantly impacted by rapid technological
developments and a lagging legal framework to address those technological
changes.”214 Courts are making steps in the right direction by finding that
public officials’ social media pages can be public forums. However, any
jurisprudence applied to social media will never be fully concrete.215 Despite
this, progress can still be made, and there needs to be a more straight-forward
methodology that ensures constituents’ First Amendment rights are protected
when interacting with government officials online.

212. See, e.g., Campbell v. Reisch, No. 2:18-CV-4129-BCW, 2019 WL 3856591,
at *9 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2019) (notice of appeal filed in the Eighth Circuit). These
future cases will not be limited to just Facebook and Twitter. Other social media
platforms like Reddit, YouTube, and Tumblr might also be part of this future
discussion. However, the analyses will likely be similar to those considering
Facebook and Twitter because all of these social media platforms use “interactive
spaces.”
213. Know Your Rights: Social Media Blocking by Public Officials, ACLU
MASSACHUSETTS,
https://www.aclum.org/en/know-your-rights/know-your-rightssocial-media-blocking-public-officials [https://perma.cc/32FT-G8ES] (last visited
Sep. 30, 2020).
214. McKercher v. Morrison, No. 18CV1054 JM(BLM), 2019 WL 1098935, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019).
215. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (“The forces and
directions of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts must
be conscious that what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.”).
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